Abstract
Divine Simplicity has it that God is absolutely simple. God exhibits no metaphysical complexity; he has neither proper parts nor distinct intrinsic properties. Recently, Jeffrey Brower has put forward an account of divine simplicity that has it that God is the truthmaker for all intrinsic essential predications about him. This allows Brower to preserve the intuitive thought that God is not a property but a concrete being. In this paper, I provide two objections to Brower's account that are meant to show that whatever merits this account of divine simplicity has, plausibility is not one of them.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 460-474 |
| Number of pages | 15 |
| Journal | Faith and Philosophy |
| Volume | 31 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Oct 1 2014 |
| Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Religious studies
- Philosophy