Pettigrew offers new axiomatic constraints on legitimate measures of inaccuracy. His axiom called 'Decomposition' stipulates that legitimate measures of inaccuracy evaluate a credence function in part based on its level of calibration at a world. I argue that if calibration is valuable, as Pettigrew claims, then this fact is an explanandum for accuracy-first epistemologists, not an explanans, for three reasons. First, the intuitive case for the importance of calibration isn't as strong as Pettigrew believes. Second, calibration is a perniciously global property that both contravenes Pettigrew's own views about the nature of credence functions themselves and undercuts the achievements and ambitions of accuracy-first epistemology. Finally, Decomposition introduces a new kind of value compatible with but separate from accuracy-proper in violation of Pettigrew's alethic monism.
|Original language||English (US)|
|Number of pages||11|
|State||Published - Mar 1 2017|
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- History and Philosophy of Science