Abstract
When accidental bequests signal otherwise unobservable individual characteristics, such as productivity and longevity, the population should be partitioned into two groups: those who do not receive an inheritance and those who do. The first tagged group receives a Mirrlees second-best tax schedule; the second group, when its type is fully revealed, faces a first-best tax schedule. Receiving an inheritance makes high-ability types worse off and low-ability types better off. High-ability individuals face a bequest tax of more than 100 percent, while low-ability types face a bequest tax that can be smaller, as well as larger, than 100 percent, and it might even be negative.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 1437-1459 |
Number of pages | 23 |
Journal | Scandinavian Journal of Economics |
Volume | 114 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Dec 2012 |
Keywords
- Accidental bequests
- Estate tax
- First-best
- Second-best
- Tagging
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics