TY - JOUR
T1 - A system capable of verifiably and privately screening global DNA synthesis
AU - Baum, Carsten
AU - Berlips, Jens
AU - Chen, Walther
AU - Cozzarini, Helena
AU - Cui, Hongrui
AU - Damgård, Ivan
AU - Dong, Jiangbin
AU - Esvelt, Kevin M.
AU - Foner, Leonard
AU - Gao, Mingyu
AU - Gretton, Dana
AU - Kysel, Martin
AU - Li, Juanru
AU - Li, Xiang
AU - Paneth, Omer
AU - Rivest, Ronald L.
AU - Sage-Ling, Francesca
AU - Shamir, Adi
AU - Shen, Yue
AU - Sun, Meicen
AU - Vaikuntanathan, Vinod
AU - Van Hauwe, Lynn
AU - Vogel, Theia
AU - Weinstein-Raun, Benjamin
AU - Wang, Yun
AU - Wichs, Daniel
AU - Wooster, Stephen
AU - Yao, Andrew C.
AU - Yu, Yu
AU - Zhang, Haoling
AU - Zhang, Kaiyi
N1 - This work was supported by the Open Philanthropy Project (to MIT, Aarhus University and SecureBio), an anonymous philanthropist from the mainland of China (to Tsinghua University), the Aphorism Foundation (to MIT and SecureBio) and the Effective Giving (to MIT and SecureBio). The funders had no role in study design, data collection, data analysis, data interpretation, or writing of the report. To preserve international neutrality, no government funds were used to support this project.
PY - 2026/7
Y1 - 2026/7
N2 - Printing custom DNA sequences is essential to scientific and biomedical research, but the technology can be used to manufacture plagues as well as cures. Just as ink printers recognize and reject attempts to counterfeit money, DNA synthesizers and assemblers should deny unauthorized requests to make viral DNA that could be misused. There are three complications. First, we do not need to quickly update printers to deal with newly discovered currencies, whereas we regularly learn of new potential pandemic viruses and other biological threats. Second, convincing counterfeit bills cannot be printed in small pieces and taped together, while preventing the distributed synthesis and subsequent re-assembly of controlled sequences will require tracking which DNA fragments have been ordered across all providers and benchtop devices while protecting legitimate customer privacy. Finally, counterfeiting can at worst undermine faith in currency, whereas unauthorized DNA synthesis could be used to deliberately cause pandemics. Here we describe SecureDNA, a free, privacy-preserving and fully automated system capable of verifiably screening all DNA synthesis orders of 30+ nucleotides against an up-to-date database of controlled sequences, and its operational performance and specificity when applied to 67 million nucleotides of DNA synthesized by providers in the USA, Europe and China.
AB - Printing custom DNA sequences is essential to scientific and biomedical research, but the technology can be used to manufacture plagues as well as cures. Just as ink printers recognize and reject attempts to counterfeit money, DNA synthesizers and assemblers should deny unauthorized requests to make viral DNA that could be misused. There are three complications. First, we do not need to quickly update printers to deal with newly discovered currencies, whereas we regularly learn of new potential pandemic viruses and other biological threats. Second, convincing counterfeit bills cannot be printed in small pieces and taped together, while preventing the distributed synthesis and subsequent re-assembly of controlled sequences will require tracking which DNA fragments have been ordered across all providers and benchtop devices while protecting legitimate customer privacy. Finally, counterfeiting can at worst undermine faith in currency, whereas unauthorized DNA synthesis could be used to deliberately cause pandemics. Here we describe SecureDNA, a free, privacy-preserving and fully automated system capable of verifiably screening all DNA synthesis orders of 30+ nucleotides against an up-to-date database of controlled sequences, and its operational performance and specificity when applied to 67 million nucleotides of DNA synthesized by providers in the USA, Europe and China.
KW - cryptography
KW - DNA synthesis screening
KW - privacy
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105044171783
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105044171783#tab=citedBy
U2 - 10.1093/nsr/nwag103
DO - 10.1093/nsr/nwag103
M3 - Article
C2 - 42427467
AN - SCOPUS:105044171783
SN - 2095-5138
VL - 13
JO - National Science Review
JF - National Science Review
IS - 14
M1 - nwag103
ER -