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A Quantitative Model of Dynamic Moral Hazard
Hengjie Ai,
Dana Kiku
, Rui Li
Finance
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peer-review
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Keyphrases
Quantitative Model
100%
Dynamic Model
100%
Moral Hazard
100%
Dynamic Moral Hazard
100%
Managerial Compensation
66%
Shock
33%
Total Variation
33%
Equilibrium Model
33%
Firm Size
33%
Size Growth
33%
Aggregate Output
33%
Optimal Contract
33%
Firm Output
33%
Moral Hazard Problem
33%
Pay-performance Sensitivity
33%
Firm Manager
33%
Incentive Pay
33%
Productivity Shocks
33%
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Moral Hazard
100%
Equilibrium Model
20%
Firm Size
20%
Executive Compensation
20%
Performance Pay
20%