Abstract
Mechanisms based on maximizing Nash Social Welfare (NSW) have proven to be fair and efficient for a wide variety of fair division problems. We study the fractional allocations maximizing NSW, i.e., a Nash-bargaining-based mechanism, for one-sided matching markets with endowments, under dichotomous utilities, and show that they are the solutions of a rational convex program (RCP). Moreover, we provide a simple combinatorial polynomial time algorithm to maximize NSW by identifying the Nash bargaining points with the equilibrium of a novel type of market, the variable-budget market model. Lastly, we show that maximizing NSW is strategyproof under the assumption that the agents' disagreement utilities are public knowledge.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 2721-2723 |
Number of pages | 3 |
Journal | Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS |
Volume | 2023-May |
State | Published - 2023 |
Event | 22nd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2023 - London, United Kingdom Duration: May 29 2023 → Jun 2 2023 |
Keywords
- Dichotomous Utilities
- Nash Bargaining Solution
- Rational Convex Program
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Artificial Intelligence
- Software
- Control and Systems Engineering