A Nash-Bargaining-Based Mechanism for One-Sided Matching Markets with Endowments and Dichotomous Utilities

Jugal Garg, Thorben Tröbst, Vijay V. Vazirani

Research output: Contribution to journalConference articlepeer-review

Abstract

Mechanisms based on maximizing Nash Social Welfare (NSW) have proven to be fair and efficient for a wide variety of fair division problems. We study the fractional allocations maximizing NSW, i.e., a Nash-bargaining-based mechanism, for one-sided matching markets with endowments, under dichotomous utilities, and show that they are the solutions of a rational convex program (RCP). Moreover, we provide a simple combinatorial polynomial time algorithm to maximize NSW by identifying the Nash bargaining points with the equilibrium of a novel type of market, the variable-budget market model. Lastly, we show that maximizing NSW is strategyproof under the assumption that the agents' disagreement utilities are public knowledge.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)2721-2723
Number of pages3
JournalProceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
Volume2023-May
StatePublished - 2023
Event22nd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2023 - London, United Kingdom
Duration: May 29 2023Jun 2 2023

Keywords

  • Dichotomous Utilities
  • Nash Bargaining Solution
  • Rational Convex Program

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Software
  • Control and Systems Engineering

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