Abstract
This article analyzes the behavior of an oligopoly of risk-averse insurers that insure many consumers facing identical independent risks; however, the probability of a loss is ex ante not known with certainty. It is shown that there is a continuum of equilibria in the Bertrand game. The most plausible equilibrium can be obtained by requiring that all insurers are content with the number of policies they sell given the equilibrium premium.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 41-48 |
| Number of pages | 8 |
| Journal | GENEVA Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory |
| Volume | 23 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jun 1998 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Imperfect competition
- Insurance
- Oligopoly
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Accounting
- General Business, Management and Accounting
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics