A model of an oligopoly in an insurance market

Mattias K. Polborn

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


This article analyzes the behavior of an oligopoly of risk-averse insurers that insure many consumers facing identical independent risks; however, the probability of a loss is ex ante not known with certainty. It is shown that there is a continuum of equilibria in the Bertrand game. The most plausible equilibrium can be obtained by requiring that all insurers are content with the number of policies they sell given the equilibrium premium.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)41-48
Number of pages8
JournalGENEVA Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory
Issue number1
StatePublished - Jun 1998
Externally publishedYes


  • Imperfect competition
  • Insurance
  • Oligopoly

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • General Business, Management and Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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