A mechanism design approach to dynamic price-based control of multi-agent systems

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

We show how ideas and tools from the field of mechanism design in economics can be brought to bear on the problem of price-based control of dynamical systems. Specifically, we take inspiration from the Vickrey-Clarkes-Groves mechanism to design strategy-proof dynamic price-functions, which can induce subsystems to apply socially efficient control inputs even though they are self-interested and possibly strategically misreport their cost and dynamics’ models to the control designer.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationDistributed Decision Making and Control
PublisherSpringer
Pages113-129
Number of pages17
ISBN (Print)9781447122647
DOIs
StatePublished - 2012

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences
Volume417
ISSN (Print)0170-8643

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Library and Information Sciences

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