A mechanism design approach to dynamic price-based control of multi-agent systems

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

We show how ideas and tools from the field of mechanism design in economics can be brought to bear on the problem of price-based control of dynamical systems. Specifically, we take inspiration from the Vickrey-Clarkes-Groves mechanism to design strategy-proof dynamic price-functions, which can induce subsystems to apply socially efficient control inputs even though they are self-interested and possibly strategically misreport their cost and dynamics’ models to the control designer.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationDistributed Decision Making and Control
PublisherSpringer-Verlag
Pages113-129
Number of pages17
ISBN (Print)9781447122647
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2012

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences
Volume417
ISSN (Print)0170-8643

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subsystem
costs
economics

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Library and Information Sciences

Cite this

Langbort, C. (2012). A mechanism design approach to dynamic price-based control of multi-agent systems. In Distributed Decision Making and Control (pp. 113-129). (Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences; Vol. 417). Springer-Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-2265-4_5

A mechanism design approach to dynamic price-based control of multi-agent systems. / Langbort, Cédric.

Distributed Decision Making and Control. Springer-Verlag, 2012. p. 113-129 (Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences; Vol. 417).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Langbort, C 2012, A mechanism design approach to dynamic price-based control of multi-agent systems. in Distributed Decision Making and Control. Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences, vol. 417, Springer-Verlag, pp. 113-129. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-2265-4_5
Langbort C. A mechanism design approach to dynamic price-based control of multi-agent systems. In Distributed Decision Making and Control. Springer-Verlag. 2012. p. 113-129. (Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-2265-4_5
Langbort, Cédric. / A mechanism design approach to dynamic price-based control of multi-agent systems. Distributed Decision Making and Control. Springer-Verlag, 2012. pp. 113-129 (Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences).
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