A Kantian conception of global justice

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

I start this article by addressing Kant's question why rightful interactions require both domestic public authorities (or states) and a global public authority? Of central importance are two issues: first, the identification of problems insoluble without public authorities, and second, why a domestic public monopoly on coercion can be rightfully established and maintained by coercive means while a global public monopoly on coercion cannot be established once and for all. In the second part of the article, I address the nature of the institutional structure of individual states and of the global authority. Crucial here, I argue, is Kant's distinction between private and public right. Private right concerns rightful relations between individual legal subjects, where public right concerns legal subjects claims on their public institutions. I propose that the distinction between private and public right should be central to liberal critiques of current legal and political developments in the global sphere.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)2043-2057
Number of pages15
JournalReview of International Studies
Volume37
Issue number5
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2011

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public authorities
justice
monopoly
public institution
political development
interaction

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Political Science and International Relations

Cite this

A Kantian conception of global justice. / Varden, Helga.

In: Review of International Studies, Vol. 37, No. 5, 01.12.2011, p. 2043-2057.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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