TY - GEN
T1 - A Game Theoretic Model for Aggregate Bypassing Behavior of Vehicles at Traffic Diverges
AU - Mehr, Negar
AU - Li, Ruolin
AU - Horowitz, Roberto
N1 - Funding Information:
This work is supported by the National Science Foundation under Grants CPS 1446145 and CPS 1545116.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2018 IEEE.
PY - 2018/12/7
Y1 - 2018/12/7
N2 - Vehicle bypassing is known to negatively affect delays at traffic diverges. However, due to the complexities of this phenomenon, accurate and yet simple models of such lane change maneuvers are hard to develop. In this work, we present a macroscopic model for predicting the number of vehicles that bypass at a traffic diverge. We take into account the selfishness of vehicles in selecting their lanes; every vehicle selects lanes such that its own cost is minimized. We discuss how we model the costs that are experienced by vehicles. Then, taking into account the selfish behavior of vehicles, we model the lane choice of vehicles at a traffic diverge as a Wardrop equilibrium. We state and prove the properties of Wardrop equilibrium in our model. We show that there always exists an equilibrium for our model. Moreover, unlike most nonlinear asymmetrical routing games, we prove that the equilibrium is unique under mild assumptions. We discuss how our model can be easily calibrated by running a simple optimization problem. Using our calibrated model, we validate it through simulation studies and demonstrate that our model successfully predicts the aggregate lane change maneuvers that are performed by vehicles for bypassing at a traffic diverge. We further discuss how our model can be employed to obtain the optimal lane choice behavior of vehicles, where the social or total cost of vehicles is minimized.
AB - Vehicle bypassing is known to negatively affect delays at traffic diverges. However, due to the complexities of this phenomenon, accurate and yet simple models of such lane change maneuvers are hard to develop. In this work, we present a macroscopic model for predicting the number of vehicles that bypass at a traffic diverge. We take into account the selfishness of vehicles in selecting their lanes; every vehicle selects lanes such that its own cost is minimized. We discuss how we model the costs that are experienced by vehicles. Then, taking into account the selfish behavior of vehicles, we model the lane choice of vehicles at a traffic diverge as a Wardrop equilibrium. We state and prove the properties of Wardrop equilibrium in our model. We show that there always exists an equilibrium for our model. Moreover, unlike most nonlinear asymmetrical routing games, we prove that the equilibrium is unique under mild assumptions. We discuss how our model can be easily calibrated by running a simple optimization problem. Using our calibrated model, we validate it through simulation studies and demonstrate that our model successfully predicts the aggregate lane change maneuvers that are performed by vehicles for bypassing at a traffic diverge. We further discuss how our model can be employed to obtain the optimal lane choice behavior of vehicles, where the social or total cost of vehicles is minimized.
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U2 - 10.1109/ITSC.2018.8569463
DO - 10.1109/ITSC.2018.8569463
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85060468370
T3 - IEEE Conference on Intelligent Transportation Systems, Proceedings, ITSC
SP - 1968
EP - 1973
BT - 2018 IEEE Intelligent Transportation Systems Conference, ITSC 2018
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 21st IEEE International Conference on Intelligent Transportation Systems, ITSC 2018
Y2 - 4 November 2018 through 7 November 2018
ER -