A game-theoretic approach to a task delegation problem

Donya G. Dobakhshari, Lav R Varshney, Vijay Gupta

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

We study a setting in which a principal selects an agent to execute a collection of tasks according to a specified priority sequence. Agents, however, have their own individual priority sequences according to which they wish to execute the tasks. There is information asymmetry since each priority sequence is private knowledge for the individual agent. We design a mechanism for selecting the agent and incentivizing the selected agent to realize a priority sequence for executing the tasks that achieves socially optimal performance. Our proposed mechanism consists of two parts. First, the principal runs an auction to select an agent to allocate tasks to with minimum declared priority sequence misalignment. Then, the principal rewards the agent according to the realized priority sequence with which the tasks were performed. We show that the proposed mechanism is individually rational and incentive compatible. Further, it is also socially optimal for the case of linear cost of priority sequence modification for the agents.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationConference Record of 51st Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers, ACSSC 2017
EditorsMichael B. Matthews
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages1271-1276
Number of pages6
Volume2017-October
ISBN (Electronic)9781538618233
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 10 2018
Event51st Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers, ACSSC 2017 - Pacific Grove, United States
Duration: Oct 29 2017Nov 1 2017

Other

Other51st Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers, ACSSC 2017
CountryUnited States
CityPacific Grove
Period10/29/1711/1/17

Fingerprint

Delegation
games
Game
Information Asymmetry
incentives
Misalignment
Auctions
Incentives
Reward
misalignment
asymmetry
costs
Costs

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Optimization
  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Hardware and Architecture
  • Signal Processing
  • Biomedical Engineering
  • Instrumentation

Cite this

Dobakhshari, D. G., Varshney, L. R., & Gupta, V. (2018). A game-theoretic approach to a task delegation problem. In M. B. Matthews (Ed.), Conference Record of 51st Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers, ACSSC 2017 (Vol. 2017-October, pp. 1271-1276). [8335557] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/ACSSC.2017.8335557

A game-theoretic approach to a task delegation problem. / Dobakhshari, Donya G.; Varshney, Lav R; Gupta, Vijay.

Conference Record of 51st Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers, ACSSC 2017. ed. / Michael B. Matthews. Vol. 2017-October Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2018. p. 1271-1276 8335557.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Dobakhshari, DG, Varshney, LR & Gupta, V 2018, A game-theoretic approach to a task delegation problem. in MB Matthews (ed.), Conference Record of 51st Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers, ACSSC 2017. vol. 2017-October, 8335557, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 1271-1276, 51st Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers, ACSSC 2017, Pacific Grove, United States, 10/29/17. https://doi.org/10.1109/ACSSC.2017.8335557
Dobakhshari DG, Varshney LR, Gupta V. A game-theoretic approach to a task delegation problem. In Matthews MB, editor, Conference Record of 51st Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers, ACSSC 2017. Vol. 2017-October. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2018. p. 1271-1276. 8335557 https://doi.org/10.1109/ACSSC.2017.8335557
Dobakhshari, Donya G. ; Varshney, Lav R ; Gupta, Vijay. / A game-theoretic approach to a task delegation problem. Conference Record of 51st Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers, ACSSC 2017. editor / Michael B. Matthews. Vol. 2017-October Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2018. pp. 1271-1276
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