A faithful distributed implementation of dual decomposition and average consensus algorithms

Takashi Tanaka, Farhad Farokhi, Cédric Langbort

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

We consider large scale cost allocation problems and consensus seeking problems for multiple agents in which agents are suggested to collaborate in a distributed algorithm to find a solution. If agents are strategic and minimize their own individual cost rather than the global social cost, they are endowed with an incentive not to follow the intended algorithm, unless the tax/subsidy mechanism is carefully designed. Inspired by the classical Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism and more recent algorithmic mechanism design theory, we propose a tax mechanism that incentivises agents to faithfully implement the intended algorithm. In particular, a new notion of asymptotic incentive compatibility is introduced to characterize a desirable property of such class of mechanisms. The proposed class of tax mechanisms provides a sequence of mechanisms that gives agents a diminishing incentive to deviate from suggested algorithm.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2013 IEEE 52nd Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2013
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages2985-2990
Number of pages6
ISBN (Print)9781467357173
DOIs
StatePublished - 2013
Event52nd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2013 - Florence, Italy
Duration: Dec 10 2013Dec 13 2013

Publication series

NameProceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
ISSN (Print)0191-2216

Other

Other52nd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2013
Country/TerritoryItaly
CityFlorence
Period12/10/1312/13/13

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Modeling and Simulation
  • Control and Optimization

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