A dynamic transmitter-jammer game with asymmetric information

Abhishek Gupta, Ashutosh Nayyar, Cedric Langbort, Tamer Basar

Research output: Contribution to journalConference article

Abstract

We consider a jamming attack on a transmitter-receiver pair, in which the transmitter wants to transmit the state of an i.i.d. Gaussian process across an unsecured communication channel to the receiver while minimizing its cost functional. The transmitter decides whether or not to transmit the current state of the random process. The jammer disrupts the transmission on the channel strategically in order to increase the total cost to the transmitter, but can do this only a limited number of times over the entire horizon. The jammer only detects whether or not a transmission is happening over the channel, but does not observe the state of the random process being transmitted. This leads to a dynamic zero-sum game with asymmetric information between the transmitter and the jammer. We prove that the saddle-point strategy of the transmitter is threshold-based and that under certain conditions, the jammer plays a mixed strategy.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number6426869
Pages (from-to)6477-6482
Number of pages6
JournalProceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2012
Event51st IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2012 - Maui, HI, United States
Duration: Dec 10 2012Dec 13 2012

Fingerprint

Asymmetric Information
Transmitter
Transmitters
Game
Random processes
Random process
Receiver
Jamming
Mixed Strategy
Dynamic Games
Zero sum game
Transceivers
Costs
Communication Channels
Saddlepoint
Gaussian Process
Horizon
Attack
Entire

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Modeling and Simulation
  • Control and Optimization

Cite this

A dynamic transmitter-jammer game with asymmetric information. / Gupta, Abhishek; Nayyar, Ashutosh; Langbort, Cedric; Basar, Tamer.

In: Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, 01.12.2012, p. 6477-6482.

Research output: Contribution to journalConference article

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