A dynamic pivot mechanism with application to real time pricing in power systems

Takashi Tanaka, Albert Zi Wen Cheng, Cedric Langbort

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

We consider a dynamic game with a single leader who tries to maximize social welfare and multiple followers who try to maximize individual profits. We present a dynamic VCG-like mechanism which induces followers to implement the optimal control desired by the leader. The proposed mechanism achieves feedback incentive compatibility as well as two other desirable properties, namely participation rationality and acquisition feasibility, under certain conditions. The mechanism is intended to be a possible alternative real time power pricing scheme, whose desirable features are illustrated through a comparison with existing schemes.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2012 American Control Conference, ACC 2012
Pages3705-3711
Number of pages7
StatePublished - Nov 26 2012
Event2012 American Control Conference, ACC 2012 - Montreal, QC, Canada
Duration: Jun 27 2012Jun 29 2012

Publication series

NameProceedings of the American Control Conference
ISSN (Print)0743-1619

Other

Other2012 American Control Conference, ACC 2012
CountryCanada
CityMontreal, QC
Period6/27/126/29/12

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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