TY - GEN
T1 - A dynamic pivot mechanism with application to real time pricing in power systems
AU - Tanaka, Takashi
AU - Cheng, Albert Zi Wen
AU - Langbort, Cedric
PY - 2012
Y1 - 2012
N2 - We consider a dynamic game with a single leader who tries to maximize social welfare and multiple followers who try to maximize individual profits. We present a dynamic VCG-like mechanism which induces followers to implement the optimal control desired by the leader. The proposed mechanism achieves feedback incentive compatibility as well as two other desirable properties, namely participation rationality and acquisition feasibility, under certain conditions. The mechanism is intended to be a possible alternative real time power pricing scheme, whose desirable features are illustrated through a comparison with existing schemes.
AB - We consider a dynamic game with a single leader who tries to maximize social welfare and multiple followers who try to maximize individual profits. We present a dynamic VCG-like mechanism which induces followers to implement the optimal control desired by the leader. The proposed mechanism achieves feedback incentive compatibility as well as two other desirable properties, namely participation rationality and acquisition feasibility, under certain conditions. The mechanism is intended to be a possible alternative real time power pricing scheme, whose desirable features are illustrated through a comparison with existing schemes.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84869424208&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84869424208&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/acc.2012.6315337
DO - 10.1109/acc.2012.6315337
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84869424208
SN - 9781457710957
T3 - Proceedings of the American Control Conference
SP - 3705
EP - 3711
BT - 2012 American Control Conference, ACC 2012
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 2012 American Control Conference, ACC 2012
Y2 - 27 June 2012 through 29 June 2012
ER -