A constrained evolutionary Gaussian multiple access channel game

Quanyan Zhu, Hamidou Tembine, Tamer Başar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

In this paper, we formulate an evolutionary multiple access channel game with continuous-variable actions and coupled rate constraints. We characterize Nash equilibria of the game and show that the pure Nash equilibria are Pareto optimal and also resilient to deviations by coalitions of any size, i.e., they are strong equilibria. We use the concepts of price of anarchy and strong price of anarchy to study the performance of the system. The paper also addresses how to select one specific equilibrium solution using the concepts of normalized equilibrium and evolutionary stable strategies. We examine the long-run behavior of these strategies under several classes of evolutionary game dynamics such as Brownvon Neumann-Nash dynamics, and replicator dynamics.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09
Pages403-410
Number of pages8
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 20 2009
Event2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09 - Istanbul, Turkey
Duration: May 13 2009May 15 2009

Publication series

NameProceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09

Other

Other2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09
CountryTurkey
CityIstanbul
Period5/13/095/15/09

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition

Cite this

Zhu, Q., Tembine, H., & Başar, T. (2009). A constrained evolutionary Gaussian multiple access channel game. In Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09 (pp. 403-410). [5137426] (Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09). https://doi.org/10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137426

A constrained evolutionary Gaussian multiple access channel game. / Zhu, Quanyan; Tembine, Hamidou; Başar, Tamer.

Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09. 2009. p. 403-410 5137426 (Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Zhu, Q, Tembine, H & Başar, T 2009, A constrained evolutionary Gaussian multiple access channel game. in Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09., 5137426, Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09, pp. 403-410, 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09, Istanbul, Turkey, 5/13/09. https://doi.org/10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137426
Zhu Q, Tembine H, Başar T. A constrained evolutionary Gaussian multiple access channel game. In Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09. 2009. p. 403-410. 5137426. (Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09). https://doi.org/10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137426
Zhu, Quanyan ; Tembine, Hamidou ; Başar, Tamer. / A constrained evolutionary Gaussian multiple access channel game. Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09. 2009. pp. 403-410 (Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09).
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