A constrained evolutionary Gaussian multiple access channel game

Quanyan Zhu; Hamidou Tembine; Tamer Başar

doi:10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137426

A constrained evolutionary Gaussian multiple access channel game

Quanyan Zhu, Hamidou Tembine, Tamer Başar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Abstract

In this paper, we formulate an evolutionary multiple access channel game with continuous-variable actions and coupled rate constraints. We characterize Nash equilibria of the game and show that the pure Nash equilibria are Pareto optimal and also resilient to deviations by coalitions of any size, i.e., they are strong equilibria. We use the concepts of price of anarchy and strong price of anarchy to study the performance of the system. The paper also addresses how to select one specific equilibrium solution using the concepts of normalized equilibrium and evolutionary stable strategies. We examine the long-run behavior of these strategies under several classes of evolutionary game dynamics such as Brownvon Neumann-Nash dynamics, and replicator dynamics.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09
Pages	403-410
Number of pages	8
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137426
State	Published - 2009
Event	2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09 - Istanbul, Turkey Duration: May 13 2009 → May 15 2009

Publication series

Name	Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09

Other

Other	2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09
Country/Territory	Turkey
City	Istanbul
Period	5/13/09 → 5/15/09

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Computer Networks and Communications
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition

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10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137426

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Zhu, Q., Tembine, H., & Başar, T. (2009). A constrained evolutionary Gaussian multiple access channel game. In Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09 (pp. 403-410). Article 5137426 (Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09). https://doi.org/10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137426

A constrained evolutionary Gaussian multiple access channel game. / Zhu, Quanyan; Tembine, Hamidou; Başar, Tamer.
Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09. 2009. p. 403-410 5137426 (Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Zhu, Q, Tembine, H & Başar, T 2009, A constrained evolutionary Gaussian multiple access channel game. in Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09., 5137426, Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09, pp. 403-410, 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09, Istanbul, Turkey, 5/13/09. https://doi.org/10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137426

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A constrained evolutionary Gaussian multiple access channel game

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