Abstract
Interorganizational systems (IOSs) are an important source of firms' competitive advantages in the global economy. For any firm, the adoption of an IOS is a complicated strategic decision. While firms' relationship specific investments determine the total benefit generated by the system, their relative bargaining power affects the future value allocation. To investigate firms' optimal IOS adoption strategies, we develop a game theoretical model based on the asymmetric Nash Bargaining theory. Our analysis shows that it is easier to achieve superior supply chain level performance if trading partners have comparable bargaining power rather than unequal power. Firms under-invest in an IOS since they cannot internalize all benefits from their own efforts. While one firms' precommitment can reduce the underinvestment of the IOS, it will not change how benefits is divided between participating firms.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Association for Information Systems - 12th Americas Conference On Information Systems, AMCIS 2006 |
| Pages | 2543-2548 |
| Number of pages | 6 |
| Volume | 4 |
| State | Published - 2006 |
| Event | 12th Americas Conference on Information Systems, AMCIS 2006 - Acapulco, Mexico Duration: Aug 4 2006 → Aug 6 2006 |
Other
| Other | 12th Americas Conference on Information Systems, AMCIS 2006 |
|---|---|
| Country/Territory | Mexico |
| City | Acapulco |
| Period | 8/4/06 → 8/6/06 |
Keywords
- Bargaining power structure
- Co-adoption
- Interdependent benefits
- Interorganizational systems
- Precommitment
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Computer Science Applications
- Computer Networks and Communications
- Library and Information Sciences
- Information Systems