TY - GEN
T1 - A clean slate design for secure wireless ad-hoc networks - Part 1
T2 - 2015 13th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2015
AU - Ponniah, Jonathan
AU - Hu, Yih Chun
AU - Kumar, P. R.
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2015 IFIP.
PY - 2015/7/6
Y1 - 2015/7/6
N2 - We propose a clean-slate, holistic approach to the design of secure protocols for wireless ad-hoc networks. We design a protocol that enables a collection of distributed nodes to emerge from a primordial birth and form a functioning network. We consider the case when nodes are synchronized and the network is closed, in that no other nodes can join. We define a game between protocols and adversarial nodes, and describe a protocol that is guaranteed to achieve the max-min payoff regardless of what the adversarial nodes do. Moreover, even though the adversarial nodes always know the protocol a priori, we show an even stronger result; the protocol is guaranteed to achieve the min-max payoff. Hence there is a saddle point in the game between protocols and adversarial strategies. Finally, we show that the adversarial nodes are in effect, strategically confined to either jamming or conforming to the protocol. These guarantees are contingent on a set of underlying model assumptions, and cease to be valid if the assumptions are violated.
AB - We propose a clean-slate, holistic approach to the design of secure protocols for wireless ad-hoc networks. We design a protocol that enables a collection of distributed nodes to emerge from a primordial birth and form a functioning network. We consider the case when nodes are synchronized and the network is closed, in that no other nodes can join. We define a game between protocols and adversarial nodes, and describe a protocol that is guaranteed to achieve the max-min payoff regardless of what the adversarial nodes do. Moreover, even though the adversarial nodes always know the protocol a priori, we show an even stronger result; the protocol is guaranteed to achieve the min-max payoff. Hence there is a saddle point in the game between protocols and adversarial strategies. Finally, we show that the adversarial nodes are in effect, strategically confined to either jamming or conforming to the protocol. These guarantees are contingent on a set of underlying model assumptions, and cease to be valid if the assumptions are violated.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84941073694&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84941073694&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/WIOPT.2015.7151070
DO - 10.1109/WIOPT.2015.7151070
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84941073694
T3 - 2015 13th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2015
SP - 175
EP - 182
BT - 2015 13th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2015
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Y2 - 25 May 2015 through 29 May 2015
ER -