A BGP attack against traffic engineering

Jintae Kim, Steven Y. Ko, David Malcolm Nicol, Xenofontas A. Dimitropoulos, George F. Riley

Research output: Contribution to journalConference article

Abstract

As the Internet grows, traffic engineering has become a widely-used technique to control the flow of packets. For the inter-domain routing, traffic engineering relies on configurations of the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). While it is recognized that the misconfiguration of BGP can cause negative effects on the Internet, we consider attack methods that disable traffic engineering regardless of the correctness of configurations. We focus on the redirection of traffic as our attack objective, and present attack scenarios on some dominant sample network topologies to achieve this objective. We also evaluate and validate these attacks using two different discrete-event simulators, one that models BGP behavior on a network, and another that emulates it using direct-execution of working BGP code.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)318-326
Number of pages9
JournalProceedings - Winter Simulation Conference
Volume1
StatePublished - Dec 1 2004
EventProceedings of the 2004 Winter Simulation Conference - Washington, DC, United States
Duration: Dec 5 2004Dec 8 2004

Fingerprint

Traffic Engineering
Gateways (computer networks)
Gateway
Attack
Network protocols
Internet
Internet Traffic
Configuration
Discrete Event
Network Topology
Correctness
Simulator
Routing
Simulators
Topology
Traffic
Scenarios
Evaluate

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software
  • Modeling and Simulation
  • Computer Science Applications

Cite this

Kim, J., Ko, S. Y., Nicol, D. M., Dimitropoulos, X. A., & Riley, G. F. (2004). A BGP attack against traffic engineering. Proceedings - Winter Simulation Conference, 1, 318-326.

A BGP attack against traffic engineering. / Kim, Jintae; Ko, Steven Y.; Nicol, David Malcolm; Dimitropoulos, Xenofontas A.; Riley, George F.

In: Proceedings - Winter Simulation Conference, Vol. 1, 01.12.2004, p. 318-326.

Research output: Contribution to journalConference article

Kim, J, Ko, SY, Nicol, DM, Dimitropoulos, XA & Riley, GF 2004, 'A BGP attack against traffic engineering', Proceedings - Winter Simulation Conference, vol. 1, pp. 318-326.
Kim J, Ko SY, Nicol DM, Dimitropoulos XA, Riley GF. A BGP attack against traffic engineering. Proceedings - Winter Simulation Conference. 2004 Dec 1;1:318-326.
Kim, Jintae ; Ko, Steven Y. ; Nicol, David Malcolm ; Dimitropoulos, Xenofontas A. ; Riley, George F. / A BGP attack against traffic engineering. In: Proceedings - Winter Simulation Conference. 2004 ; Vol. 1. pp. 318-326.
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