TY - GEN
T1 - μsCOPE
T2 - 24th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses, RAID 2021
AU - Roessler, Nick
AU - Atayde, Lucas
AU - Palmer, Imani
AU - McKee, Derrick
AU - Pandey, Jai
AU - Kemerlis, Vasileios P.
AU - Payer, Mathias
AU - Bates, Adam
AU - Smith, Jonathan M.
AU - Dehon, Andre
AU - Dautenhahn, Nathan
N1 - Funding Information:
This research was funded in part by DARPA contracts HR0011-18-C- 0011 and HR001119S0089-AMP-FP-034; NSF grants CNS-1513687, TWC-1513854, CNS-1801601, CNS-16-57534, CNS-17-50024 and CNS-2008867; ERC StG 850868; and ONR grant BAA N00014-17-SB010. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government.
Funding Information:
This research was funded in part by DARPA contracts HR0011-18-C-0011 and HR001119S0089-AMP-FP-034; NSF grants CNS-1513687, TWC-1513854, CNS-1801601, CNS-16-57534, CNS-17-50024 and CNS-2008867; ERC StG 850868; and ONR grant BAA N00014-17-SB010. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 Owner/Author.
PY - 2021/10/6
Y1 - 2021/10/6
N2 - By prioritizing simplicity and portability, least-privilege engineering has been an afterthought in OS design, resulting in monolithic kernels where any exploit leads to total compromise. μSCOPE ("microscope") addresses this problem by automatically identifying opportunities for least-privilege separation. μSCOPE replaces expert-driven, semi-automated analysis with a general methodology for exploring a continuum of security vs. performance design points by adopting a quantitative and systematic approach to privilege analysis. We apply the μSCOPE methodology to the Linux kernel by (1) instrumenting the entire kernel to gain comprehensive, fine-grained memory access and call activity; (2) mapping these accesses to semantic information; and (3) conducting separability analysis on the kernel using both quantitative privilege and overhead metrics. We discover opportunities for orders of magnitude privilege reduction while predicting relatively low overheads - at 15% mediation overhead, overprivilege in Linux can be reduced up to 99.8% - suggesting fine-grained privilege separation is feasible and laying the groundwork for accelerating real privilege separation.
AB - By prioritizing simplicity and portability, least-privilege engineering has been an afterthought in OS design, resulting in monolithic kernels where any exploit leads to total compromise. μSCOPE ("microscope") addresses this problem by automatically identifying opportunities for least-privilege separation. μSCOPE replaces expert-driven, semi-automated analysis with a general methodology for exploring a continuum of security vs. performance design points by adopting a quantitative and systematic approach to privilege analysis. We apply the μSCOPE methodology to the Linux kernel by (1) instrumenting the entire kernel to gain comprehensive, fine-grained memory access and call activity; (2) mapping these accesses to semantic information; and (3) conducting separability analysis on the kernel using both quantitative privilege and overhead metrics. We discover opportunities for orders of magnitude privilege reduction while predicting relatively low overheads - at 15% mediation overhead, overprivilege in Linux can be reduced up to 99.8% - suggesting fine-grained privilege separation is feasible and laying the groundwork for accelerating real privilege separation.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85117682864&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85117682864&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1145/3471621.3471839
DO - 10.1145/3471621.3471839
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85117682864
T3 - ACM International Conference Proceeding Series
SP - 296
EP - 311
BT - Proceedings of 2021 24th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses, RAID 2021
PB - Association for Computing Machinery
Y2 - 6 October 2021 through 8 October 2021
ER -